Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, dissenting. * Enter a valid Journal (must
The ruling determined that a police officer has the right to order the passenger of a vehicle out of the car during a traffic stop. The Court recognized that passengers in a vehicle stopped on traffic increases the danger to the officer. In the 1970's, the Court twice rejected attempts to justify suspicionless seizures that caused only "modest" intrusions on the liberty of passengers in automobiles.
Mimms, like Wilson, urged the suppression of the evidence on the ground that the officer's ordering him out of the car was an unreasonable seizure, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, like the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, agreed.
Click here to remove this judgment from your profile. The Court's conclusion seems to rest on the assumption that the constitutional protection against "unreasonable" seizures requires nothing more than a hypothetically rational basis for intrusions on individual liberty. For safety reasons the officer is allowed to control the movement of the passengers. [1] On the public interest side of the balance, the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger.
When Wilson exited, a quantity of cocaine fell to the ground. As we have acknowledged for decades, special latitude is given to the police in effecting searches and seizures involving vehicles and their occupants. Argued December 11, 1996. Dissenting in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), then-Justice Rehnquist characterized the motorist's interest in freedom from random stops as "only the most diaphanous of citizen interests." the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office."
Id., at695. It applies equally to traffic stops in which there is not even a scintilla of evidence of any potential risk to the police officer.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio, et al., by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas and Stuart A. Cole, Assistant Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert Butterworth of Florida, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, A. Id., at 111, n. 6.
B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Scott Harshbarger of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Hiedi Heitkamp of North Dakota, W. A. Indeed, there is no indication that any of the assaults occurred when there was a complete absence of any articulable basis for concern about the officer's safety—the only condition under which I would hold that the Fourth Amendment prohibits an order commanding passengers to exit a vehicle. Hughes instructed him to return to the car and retrieve the rental documents, and he complied. It would seem that the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary reaction ofa motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop. Unfortunately, the effect of the Court's new rule on the law may turn out to be far more significant than its immediate impact on individual liberty. granted, 517 U.S. 1154 (1996). The question is whether a passenger in a lawfully stopped car may be seized, by an order to get out of the vehicle, without any evidence whatsoever that he or she poses a threat to the officer or has committed an offense.
Even so, we insisted on a reasoned explanation for the stop.
When Wilson exited the car, a quantity of crack cocaine fell to the ground. [8] The order to the passenger is unquestionably a "seizure" within the meaning ofthe Fourth Amendment. There the police had obtained a search warrant for contraband thought to be located in a residence, but when they arrived to execute the warrant they found Summers coming down the front steps. the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office."
While the driver was sitting in the driver's seat looking for the rental papers, Hughes ordered Wilson out of the car. The traffic violation sufficiently justifies subjecting the driver to detention and some police control for the time necessary to conclude the business of the stop. Since a myriad of circumstances will give a cautious officer reasonable grounds for commanding passengers to leave the vehicle, it might be thought the rule the Court adopts today will be little different in its operation than the rule offered in dissent.
As Justice Stevens concludes, the command to exit ought not to be given unless there are objective circumstances making it reasonable for the officer to issue the order.
This principle can be accommodated even where officers must make immediate decisions to ensure their own safety. . The order to the passenger is unquestionably a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. of Vermont, Julio A. Brady of U.S. Virgin Islands, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, Darrell McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al.
Terms of Use, Law Library - American Law and Legal Information, Notable Trials and Court Cases - 1995 to Present, Maryland v. Wilson - Significance, A Bright Line Rule?, A Matter Of Safety, Differing Opinions, Impact, Further Readings. Get 1 point on adding a valid citation to this judgment. We reversed, explaining that "[t]he touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always `the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security,' " 434 U. S., at 108— 109 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)), and that reasonableness "depends `on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers,' " 434 U. S., at 109 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
On the public interest side of the balance, we noted that the State "freely concede[d]" that there had been nothing unusual or suspicious to justify ordering Mimms out of the car, but that it was the officer's "practice to order all drivers [stopped in traffic stops] out of their vehicles as a matter of course" as a "precautionary measure" to protect the officer's safety.
Maryland maintained that passengers of a vehicle should be expected to exit a …
I presume that these figures are representative of present circumstances. There, Mimms had been stopped for driving with an expired license plate, and the officer asked him to step out of his car. Id., at111, n. 6. [2] Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion points out, post, at 416, that these statistics are not further broken down as to assaults by passengers and assaults by drivers.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).3 Most traffic stops involve otherwise law-abiding citizens who have committed minor traffic offenses. Ante, at 415. There is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor vehicular offense, but there is no such reason to stop or detain the passengers. In the case of passengers, the danger of the officer’s standing in the path of oncoming traffic would not be present except in the case of a passenger in the left rear seat, but the fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle increases the possible sources of harm to the officer. Can a Passenger Be Detained on a Traffic Stop? v. WILSON. We think that our opinion in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), offers guidance by analogy here.
v. Brown, 67 F. 3d 1174 (CA5 1995), cert.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied certiorari.
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