United States Supreme Court 490 U.S. 228 (1989) Facts. Because the class has already demonstrated that, as a rule, illegitimate factors were considered in the em-ployer’s decisions, the burden shifts to the employer “to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an em-ployment opportunity for legitimate reasons.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977). v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977).
When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified." In view of the plurality's treatment of Burdine and our other disparate-treatment cases, it is important first to state why those cases are dispositive here. But see ante, at 239, n. 3. The plurality went on to emphasize that in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff may not simply point to a statistical disparity in the employer's work force.
The plurality's first statement therefore appears to indicate that an employer who considers illegitimate reasons when making a decision is a violator. Each of these policies is vitally important, and each is adequately served by requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Instead, the Court outlined the following approach: "Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that his conduct was a 'substantial factor' or, to put it in other words, that it was a 'motivating factor' in the Board's decision not to rehire him. of Ed. I agree with the plurality that, on the facts presented in this case, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision concerning Ann Hopkins’ candidacy absent consideration of her gender.
The memorandum went on: “To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are those which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. If this state of affairs is proved to the factfinder, there will be no liability under the plurality's own test, for the same decision would have been made had the illegitimate reason never been considered. Lower courts long have had difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), has not proved unworkable in that context but would be hopelessly complicated in a case brought under federal antidiscrimination statutes. Because the Court of Appeals required Price Waterhouse to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence as in Mt. Like the common law of torts, the statutory employment "tort" created by Title VII has two basic purposes. We established the order of proof for individual Title VII disparate-treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and reaffirmed this allocation in Texas Dept. Thus, we shall remand this case so that that determination can be made. The very uncertainty as to what might have happened opens the door wide for conjecture. “To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor.” 110 Cong. Under the accepted approach to causation that I have discussed, sex is a cause for the employment decision whenever, either by itself or in combination with other factors, it made a difference to the decision. We decide today that the Court of Appeals had the better approach, but that both courts erred in requiring the [**1784] employer to make its proof by clear and convincing evidence. Hopkins thus failed to meet the requisite standard of proof after a full trial. Nor are we disposed to adopt the dissent’s dismissive attitude toward Dr. Fiske’s field of study and toward her own professional integrity, see post, at 293-294, n. 5.
Healthy, the District Court found that the employer was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate factors. This definition includes stereotypes based on sex, which previous definitions had not. Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Burdens of Proof > Burden Shifting This does not follow, as a matter of either semantics or logic. Moreover, there is mounting evidence in the decisions of the lower courts that respondent here is not alone in her inability to pinpoint discrimination as the precise cause of her injury, despite having shown that it played a significant role in the decisional process. The employer failed to prove that it would have denied her partnership anyway, and the Court held that constituted sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ^3 The interpretive memorandum on which the plurality relies makes plain that "the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would have the burden of proving that discrimination had occurred." Healthy and Transportation Management to resolve this case, and that our Title VII cases in this area are “inapposite,” ante, at 258-260, at best hard to understand. Section 703(a)(1) is the statutory basis of the cause of action, and the Court is obligated to explain how its disparate-treatment decisions are consistent with the terms of § 703(a)(1), not with general themes of legislative history or with other parts of the statute that are plainly inapposite. As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associ-ated with their group, for “‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.
May 1, 1989, Decided. [HN10] In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender. As Justice Brennan notes, ante, at 258, courts do not sit to determine whether litigants are nice. 618 F. 4 The plurality states that it disregards the special context of affirmative action. The plurality proceeds from the premise that the words “because of” in the statute do not embody any [*278] causal requirement at all. The shift in the burden of persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff proves by direct evidence that an unlawful motive was a substantial factor actually relied upon in making the decision. See post, at 286-289. Supp., at 1114-1115. We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute. In addition, the District Court found that the partner responsible for informing Hopkins of the factors which caused her candidacy to be placed on hold, indicated that her "professional" problems would be solved if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Brennan, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, This page was last edited on 21 July 2020, at 21:15. The amendment that added “sex” as one of the forbidden criteria for employment was passed, of course, and the statute on its face treats each of the enumerated categories exactly the same. In addition, in my view testimony such as Dr. Fiske's in this case, standing alone, would not justify shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer. There has been a strong showing that the employer has done exactly what Title VII forbids, but the connection between the employer's illegitimate motivation and any injury to the individual plaintiff is unclear. D. C. 273, 275, 705 F. 2d 1364, 1366 (1983) (Scalia, J.) 1891, 1897, n. 9, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977).
As Justice O'CONNOR states, the most that can be said with respect to the Title VII itself is that "nothing in the language, history, or purpose of Title VII prohibits adoption" of the new approach. Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, Ch. . I further agree that this burden shift is properly part of the liability phase of the litigation. Neither do they support creation of a “duty to sensitize.” As the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals observed, acceptance of such theories would turn Title VII “from a prohibition of discriminatory conduct into an engine for rooting out sexist thoughts.” 263 U.S. App. 30); another suggested that she “overcompensated for being a woman” (Defendant’s Exh.
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